The combination of an appified smart home platform and third-party apps have enabled developers to contribute their novel ideas to bring more convenience to their users. However, this also brings the potential of privacy leakage. If a third-party app is permitted to monitor a user day and night, then it will learn the behavior pattern of this user before long. In this paper, we exploited how IFTTT monitors the daily life of a user in several ways that are hardly noticeable. We propose the "Specific-fuzzification" to protect the privacy of a user in two steps: filter the unnecessary events to the IFTTT, then fuzz the value of the events that must be uploaded. We evaluated the "Specific-fuzzification" on event records of seven users, the result showed comparing the original IFTTT, the modified IFTTT patched with "Specific-fuzzification" only gained rare events and thus could no longer recognize any behavior patterns of a user.
I. INTRODUCTION
The expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) also brings development of the smart home. Smart devices, such as the various sensors and actuators, have changed the way we interact with our homes. We can remotely use a phone or a web service to monitor the state information of the house (temperature, humidity, illuminance, etc.), or control some automatic devices (turn on/off a lock, change the running mode of an air conditioner, etc.). The devices of the early stage smart home are IP-enabled and work separately. Users have to actively fetch the state information and then manually control a specific device.
In the recent years, some new platforms provide a revolution to the smart home. All these platforms adopt a new system, which can roughly be described as the combination of smart devices, a hub, the cloud backend server and its corresponding companion app. These systems provide a programming framework to the developers to contribute their novel ideas and apps, so systems become so-called appified platforms. Then users can choose apps to control the devices automatically. Any change to the state information will be uploaded to the cloud server, and triggers some apps running on the cloud. Samsung's SmartThings [1] , Googles Weave/Brillo [2] and Apple's HomeKit [3] are several dominant examples of these platforms. Among of these smart home platforms, SmartThings has more apps than the others and has gained most users because its openness. At the same time, the security and privacy issues of these new type of smart home platforms have drawn attentions from many researchers.
While these smart home platforms are developing and grabbing the market share, some of them start to integrate their platforms to the other Internet services. This allows some third-party (or denoted as the 3rd-party) Internet services and apps access the resource of a smart home user, i.e., to obtain the states of the sensors and operate the actuators in a house, which was previously only permitted by the smart home platform. Among these 3rd-party services, IFTTT has emerged and has been developing rapidly. IFTTT is an initialism for "If This, Then That". IFTTT is a free web service to create chains of simple conditional statements which are also called applets. "This" and "That" are the trigger and action of an applet respectively. In other words, an IFTTT applet can also be summarized as "If a trigger is triggered, then perform an action". An IFTTT applet can concatenate various different and popular Internet services, such as Gmail, Instagram, Facebook and SmartThings. After authorization from a SmartThings user, IFTTT can access the resource of his SmartThings account, i.e., the state of his devices and permission to operate his actuators.
However, the risk of privacy compromise to the users also comes with the convenience brought by IFTTT. This is because a user has to upload the state of corresponding devices to IFTTT, and all states are generated by the user. These state records relate to the daily life of a user and can reflect his behavior pattern.
In this paper, we analyzed the IFTTT workflow and found that the IFTTT can monitor the daily life of a user in three ways: 1) IFTTT can obtain the states of the devices that are not related to any IFTTT applets, IFTTT will not give up the access of a device once it obtained; 2) IFTTT can get redundant state records, though many records can not trigger any applets; 3) All IFTTT applets do not need the accurate values of a numeric state, but IFTTT will receive each change of a device with numeric state.
We chose to analyze SmartThings and IFTTT because these two platforms have the largest user base. There are more apps, namely SmartApps in the SmartThings platform than the competing platforms such as Weavo/Brillo and HomeKit [4] . There are 11 million users running over 1 billion applets on IFTTT [5] . As a 3rd-party app, IFTTT developed an agent SmartApp running on SmartThings to handle the state 978-1-5386-6808-5/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE information and sending the operation commands from the IFTTT server to the devices [6] .
We proposed the "Specific-fuzzification" to protect the privacy of a user. The essential idea of "Specific-fuzzification" is: an event does not always have to be uploaded to IFTTT, or if it must, it can be fuzzed. This reduces the events uploaded to IFTTT so much that it can barely recognize the behavior pattern of a user. We experimented with "Specificfuzzification" for two IFTTT agent SmartApps and identical user datasets. One is the original IFTTT agent that monitors and uploads all user events, while the other only uploads events filtered and fuzzed by "Specific-fuzzification". In comparison, IFTTT will barely recognize the behavior pattern of a user with a dataset filtered by the modified agent.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: 1) We analyze the IFTTT agent SmartApp and found privacy leakage. IFTTT can monitor a user in several ways which are hardly noticable. We believe that this can also be found in other 3rd-party apps. 2) We propose the "Specific-fuzzification" to filter the events as much as possible as while retaining funtionality. "Specific-fuzzification" can not only be applied to IFTTT but can also handle potential privacy leakage from other 3rd-party apps. 3) We verify the "Specific-fuzzification" on seven datasets from seven different users and proved that IFTTT will hardly recognize the behavior pattern of a user with rare state records.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. The Architecture of SmartThings Platform
To use the SmartThings service, a user must buy a Smart-Things hub and several end devices. All the end devices are connected via ZigBee, Z-Wave, or WiFi to a hub which maintains an SSL-protected link to the cloud backend. The end devices can be divided into two categories: sensors and actuators. The role of sensors in the SmartThings ecosystem is to gather the state of the house, for example, the presence of the user, the illuminance value of a room, the lock state of a smart lock, the power consumption of an apartment, and so forth. When a sensor detects state changes, the new state will be uploaded to the cloud backend via the hub. These new states are treated as "events". Other than sensors, actuators are devices that can "act"-they perform some specific commands such as "turn on a switch" (switch.on()) or "lock the door" (lock.close()). Every device in a house is represented by a SmartDevice running on the cloud backend. As the virtual representation of a physical device, SmartDevice translates raw data generated by an end device to events or commands that are suitable for SmartApps. The architecture of the SmartThings platform is shown in Fig. 1 . A user can browse the app market and install SmartApps using the companion app. SmartApps run on the cloud backend, but SmartThings enables the latest hub to run SmartApps. The user can grant a SmartApp the subscription to several end devices, which enables that SmartApp to monitor events generated by sensors and operate actuators by sending commands. For example, a user may install an air conditioner control SmartApp which can be summarized to "Turn on the air conditioner when the temperature is higher than 30 • C" and grant this SmartApp the temperature sensor and an air conditioner. The temperature sensor will upload temperature values to the cloud, and when this value is indeed above 30 • C, this SmartApp will send the command to the air conditioner to turn it on. This example also illustrates how the SmartThings automatically manipulate the devices as the users wish.
Of course, SmartThings have to allow manual operation by the user at any time. Before controlling any devices, the user will refresh for the latest state of his house. This means that the cloud backend must provide timely and accurate state information to the companion app.
B. WebService SmartApps and the 3rd-party App
In order to grab market share and offer more flexibility to developers, SmartThings supports the WebService SmartApps. These SmartApps expose a URL and any defined endpoints, enabling themselves as a tiny web service. A developer can implement a WebService SmartApp and a remote 3rd-party app running on a mobile phone or a web server. Granted by a user, the 3rd-party app can obtain an OAuth token released by SmartThings as the credential to communicate to the corresponding WebService SmartApp via HTTP GET, PUT, POST and DELETE methods. In other words, the 3rd-party app can access the state of, or operate the end devices that subscribed by the WebService SmartApps with that credential. The OAuth process between the 3rd-party app and the cloud backend is beyond the scope of this paper. In this scenario, the WebService SmartApp is essentially an agent SmartApp between the 3rd-party app and the end devices. This workflow differs from the regular SmartApps because the developers move the functionality of a regular SmartApp to the 3rd-party app, leaving the WebService SmartApp solely reponsible for the communications between the 3rd-party app and the end devices.
1) The 3rd-party app sends messages to the SmartApp: If the 3rd-party app wants to refresh for the state of some devices or send an operation command to a specific device, the mappings declaration in the SmartApp code allows a developer to expose the HTTP endpoints and map the various supported HTTP operations to an associated handler. The snippet in Listing 1 shows a typical WebService SmartApp supporting two endpoints. The /switches endpoint will support the GET (line 4) requests. It will call the listSwitches() method and then send back the return value. The /switches/:command endpoint enables the SmartApp to handle the PUT requests(line 9). This differs from from handling the GET requests as it can deliver the command as a parameter to updateSwithes().
2) The WebService SmartApp uploads a new event: When the WebService SmartApp receives an event, it should send this event to a 3rd-party app immediately. This procedure is also completed by HTTP related methods, such as httpGet() and httpPostJson().
C. SmartThings Working with IFTTT
Samsung and some 3rd-party developers have published numerous applets on IFTTT which works with the SmartThings platform. A user should first authorize his IFTTT account to access "resources" from his SmartThings account, then SmartThings will automatically deploy an agent SmartApp to cooperate with IFTTT. This agent is developed by IFTTT. After these steps, IFTTT is permitted to communicate to the user's end devices. We selected two popular applets which are related to SmartThings as follows.
1) Turn on Hue Lights when SmartThings detects that you've arrived home (https://ifttt.com/applets/115637pturn-on-hue-lights-when-smartthings-detects-that-youve-arrived-home, 1.2k users) trigger: the presence sensor connects to the hub (presenceSensor.presence == present) action: turn on the light (switch.on()) 2) Log door openings detected by your SmartThings to a Google Drive Spreadsheet (https://ifttt.com/applets/114080p-log-door-openingsdetected-by-your-smartthings-to-a-google-drivespreadsheet, 4.6k users) trigger: the state of the contact sensor turns to be open (contactSensor.contact == open) action: write the log information to the Google Spreadsheet of the user As these two applets show, the IFTTT applets can link two different Internet services to work together. If the trigger is a SmartThings end device, IFTTT will get the latest state of the devices once the state has changed. D. Related Work 1) IoT security: Many efforts have been put on the security topic of Internet of Things, mobile computing platform, smart home and personal privacy for a long time [7] - [11] . The existing work has proved how vital the security is in IoT network and devices [12] . The current IoT security research mainly analyzes the flaws that come with hardware [13] , protocols or key management [14] , and architectures. Sivaraman et al. analyzed threats and flaws with devices on the market and proposed that SDN technology can be used to block/quarantine and augment the device security of smart home [15] . Ali et al. investigated some potential security attacks in smart homes and evaluated their impacts [16] . This paper also forecasted that security attacks are expected to be launched in coming years. [17] proposed a logic based security algorithm to enhance smart home security. The algorithm in this paper is implemented to differentiate normal and suspicious user behavior. Additionally, Blockchain has been applied to enhance the security of smart home, for example, [18] shows an approach to provide decentralized security and privacy and solves overhead issues that are not suitable for resource and power constrained IoT devices. In 2016, Fernandes et al. first analyzed the security flaws of SmartThings [4] . This paper exploited its framework flaws, including coarse-grained capabilities, insufficient event data protection, flaws in third-party application integration, and unsafe invocation of the groovy dynamic method. Du et al. proposed the significance of key management of the communications between IoT devices [19] . Lee et al. proposed FACT to handle the coarse-grained capabilities problem in SmartThings [20] by virtualizing the devices and functionality. SmartAuth, proposed in [21] , aimed at checking what a SmartApp actually performs and the functionalities it shows to the user. While some malicious operations may be revoked in some unnoticeable scenarios, the ContexIoT was proposed to support the users' fine-grained context identification for some sensitive actions [22] . To protect the privacy of the user, [23] proposed how to track sensitive information in SmartThings through static taint analysis of SmartApps.
2) The privacy of smart home: Although manufacturers have deployed various measurements of their platforms, some papers still found flaws leaking users' privacy on the various platforms [24] - [26] . There have been many papers showing how to compromise a user's privacy via the flaws of cloud [27] , [28] , protocols or even traffic analysis. Yoshigoe et al. proposed Synthetic Packet Injection to hide the real traffic between devices and the cloud [29] . This paper illustrated the traffic patterns of several SmartThings devices. By the patterns of different devices, an adversary can infer the behavior pattern of a smart home user. Apthorpe et al. also focused on privacy leakage via network observing [30] , [31] . In this paper, they evaluated several strategies to mitigate the risk of privacy leakage when the network traffic is related to the privacy of a user, then they proved that traffic shaping can effectively prevent privacy leakage via traffic patterns. But to the best of our knowledge, there are no papers focused on privacy leakage via the 3rd-party apps.
III. PRIVACY LEAKAGE VIA IFTTT
In this section, we will prove and demonstrate how IFTTT acquires more redundant user data than it actually needs to function. IFTTT has always been monitoring the privacy data of users in a way that is easily overlooked.
A. Privacy Leakage by Untrigger-devices
We call the devices that can not trigger any applets as "untrigger-devices". There are two types of untrigger-devices: those have been authorized to IFTTT but are not related to any applets (we can also call these devices "idle-devices"), and those related to an applet but as the actuators. These actuators only perform the commands of the related applets but can not trigger them. The states of these devices are unnecessary to any applets, but IFTTT is monitoring all of these devices anyway.
1) By the idle-devices: When a user starts to configure the IFTTT's SmartThings service, they are asked to authorize IFTTT device access. Most users, if not all of them, are willing to authorize all devices to IFTTT at once, as they are unsure of what kind of applets they will install and which device new applets might access in the future. In other words, they are reluctant to go through the tedious authorization process in the future. However, even if a user triggers device authorization each time they log in, there is still a possibility of idleness. Suppose a user is installing an applet to be triggered by a switch. When the user deletes this applet, IFTTT will not give up the permission to access this switch. This is how a new idle-device is created in a way that is easily overlooked.
2) By the actuators: Actuators are another kind of untrigger-device because all they do is passively receive commands from IFTTT. This means the state change of an actuator is unnecessary for IFTTT. But after the authorization, IFTTT gains the permission to access these actuators. This makes IFTTT not only able to operate the actuators but also monitor the states of these devices.
3) Monitoring the untrigger-devices in a practical way: We reviewed the code of the agent SmartApp of IFTTT and got the details of how IFTTT monitors the states of untrigger-devices. We start with the HTTP-mapping snippet of the agent SmartApp, as shown in Listing. 2. It demonstrates that IFTTT can obtain the states of all devices of the same type at one time. For example, when the agent receives an HTTP message of a GET request with the parameter deviceType as humiditySensors, then the agent will call listStates() and all numerical values of the humidity sensors will be returned to IFTTT. IFTTT can now support 11 kinds of devices: switch, motion sensor, contact sensor, presence sensor, temperature sensor, acceleration sensor, water sensor, light sensor, humidity sensor, alarm, and lock. In daily life, data from these sensors can profile the user's behavior pattern and living environment. But IFTTT does not care if a device can trigger an applet or not. Once a device is authorized to IFTTT, it will be monitored whenever IFTTT wants, or periodically. 
B. Leaking by Redundant State Changes
After checking the monitoring approaches via untriggerdevices, we now focus on "trigger-devices". Each IFTTT applet has a corresponding trigger statement. Every time the state of a trigger device changes, the agent will upload the new state (namely, an event) to IFTTT. If an applet is satisfied by the event, it will be invoked and executed. Listing. 3 demonstrates the process before the IFTTT agent uploads a new event. Line 7 registers deviceHandler() as the event handler to the attribute of the device. Meanwhile, line 7 shows that the IFTTT agent does not subscribe deviceHandler() to a specific attribute value, but every change of attribute. This can be exemplified by the applet "Turn on Hue Lights when SmartThings detects that you've arrived home". When the user arrives home, his presence sensor connects to the hub. As a result, the value of presenceSensor.presence will change from unpresent to present. Next, deviceHandler() will be invoked and post presenceSensor.presence == present to IFTTT. At last, the applet will execute. But when the user leaves home at morning, the IFTTT will also receive the event presenceSensor.presence == unpresent because its value changes. However, presenceSensor.presence == unpresent will not trigger any applets. This means that the unpresent is unnecessary to all the applets. In other words, this event is redundant. This also implies that if this redundant event is discarded before upload to IFTTT, no applet will be distracted and all the applets will execute as normal as long as the next event can trigger it. After observing these present events for several days, IFTTT can obtain the approximate arriving time of the user. If a user has no choice but to let IFTTT know the exact time of arriving, why should he also lets IFTTT know the leaving time?
1) Trigger-devices with discrete state values: A discretedevice is one that has a limited number of possible states. For example, a presence sensor is a typical discrete-device as the value of presenceSensor.presence only corresponds two possibilities: present and unpresent. Similarly, contact sensors, locks, and switches are all discrete-devices. In order to protect the privacy of a user, we can specify all the trigger values of these devices for all the applets, then maybe the redundant values can be intercepted as they are uploading to IFTTT.
2) Trigger-devices with numeric state values: Alternative to discrete-devices, the state of a numeric-device covers a range of values. Humidity sensors, illuminance sensors, and temperature sensors are all typical devices in this category. As an instance, the state value range of an illuminance sensor may start from 5lx (a street lamp) to 100,000lx (sunshine). Therefore, the applet "If the illuminance is exactly 50,000lx, then ..." will not be practically useful. In the most cases, triggering this kind of applet corresponds to a range, not a specific value. A threshold value divides the possible range into two sub-ranges: the trigger-range and the untrigger-range. Similar to discrete-devices, all state values in the untriggerrange are redundant to the applet. But by specifying the trigger-range, we can further protect the privacy. Actually, we can hide redundant numeric state values in two aspects. This also can be illustrated by the applet "If the temperature is above 30 • C, then turn on the switch".
1) Suppose the states range of the temperature sensor is [-20, 80 ]. The threshold value 30 divides the whole temperature rang into two sub-ranges: [-20, 30] and [31, 80] . 2) We can hide changes when the values are below 31 • C, because these states belong to the untrigger-range and will not trigger this applet. This means that IFTTT will not be able to monitor the temperature fluctuation when it is below 31 • C. 3) Even if the latest value has been above 30 • C, we can hide its accurate value. Every temperature that is above 30 • C will trigger the applet, regardless if it is 35 • C or 70 • C. So, why not transfer the actual temperature state to a random value in the range of [31, 80] ?
C. Leaking by the Unnecessary Trigger Value
Now let us focus on "that" of an IFTTT applet. The "that" part will perform operations like "call my phone" or "play a song from Google music", or can operate a SmartThings actuator. When an applet operating an actuator is triggered, it will send an HTTP PUT message to the agent with the corresponding command parameter. Then, the agent operates the actuator device. Additionally, the actuator can not only be operated automatically, but also manually by the user. No matter how the actuator is operated, it will upload its new state to the SmartThings backend if the operation changes its state. But sometimes the SmartApp command or manual operation does not change the state of a device, and the device will simply discard this command. Let us use the applet "If the temperature is above 30 • C, then turn on the switch" as an example again. The switch can be automatically or manually turned on by the SmartApp or the user. When a switch has been turned on, it receives a switch.on() command and the switch does not need to repeat another switch.on() operation but discard it. The switch.on() command in this case is unnecessary as it changes nothing. This implies that the applet does not have to be invoked. Therefore, we can conclude that if the current state of the actuator for an applet equals the consequential state value of the command, then the applet does not have to be invoked and the trigger event can be intercepted before it will be uploaded to IFTTT. But now even if all the events have been filtered or randomized as we have described at Sec. III-A and Sec. III-B, there will be still too many redundant events uploaded to IFTTT.
IV. SPECIFIC-FUZZIFICATION
In this section, we will introduce the Specific-fuzzification (or Specifuz for short) mechanism of filtering and randomizing the specific event value to "fuzz" the behavior pattern of an IFTTT user.
A. The Key Information Items of Every Applet
We could extract key items that reflect how an applet is triggered and what it will do. These items include the trigger device, trigger state or state range for a numeric-device, actuator (if any), and the consequential state value of the actuator (if any, CSV for short). There is a one-to-one mapping between an IFTTT applet and the combination of these key information. For example, all the key information of "If the temperature is above 30 • C, then turn on the switch" can be summarized as {trigger device: temperature sensor, trigger state (range): [31, 100] , actuator: switch, the CSV of the actuator: on}. The first step of the specific-fuzzification is to extract the key information items from the applets that are in use. If there are D devices subscribed to an IFTTT user installed A applets, then we will obtain the corresponding A records, and A ≤ D.
B. Extract the Key Information via a Chrome Extension
A user can manage his IFTTT configuration via a mobile app or a desktop web browser. All applets can be displayed in the page "https://ifttt.com/my applets" (Fig. 2) . Each applet in the browser is labeled by a one-sentence description, from which the user can catch the functionality of an applet at a glance. These label sentences are embedded in the HTML source code of the "/my applets" page. We can find these descriptive sentences in the span tags with the class value "title". The corresponding snippet is shown in Listing 4.
We developed a Chrome extension to extract these sentences. This Chrome app can transfer all the sentences to a new form where every descriptive sentence is split into the key information items. 
C. Merge the Key Information Collection
This step is to transform the A records to a new form where all records will be merged by the identical trigger-devices. We denote the list of trigger-devices as T , and |T | ≤ A because sometimes a trigger-device can be subscribed by several applets. Suppose that the lists of discrete-devices and numericdevices are T d and T n respectively, then |T | = |T d | + |T n |.
1) Merge the A records of discrete-devices: A specific state value of a discrete-device may trigger zero, one or multiple applets. To a discrete-device, we assume that this device corresponds to a actuators. All potential state values of this discrete-device form a set S with p elements, but only t of these elements can trigger an applet, then t ≤ p. After checking these a applets triggered by this device, a table can be generated to show the mapping between every value of S to a list, which consists of the consequential state of every actuator, shown in Table. I. Every row of this table contains at least one element. For each trigger and discrete-device, a similar table can be generated.
2) Merge the records of numeric-devices: A numericdevice triggers applets with a range rather than a specific value. Like discrete-devices, the current value of a numericdevice may trigger zero, one or multiple actuators. For example: "If Illuminance sensor detects brightness above 500 lux, then switch off Switch A " and "If Illuminance sensor detects brightness above 600 lux, then switch off Switch B ".
Like discrete-devices, the state of a numeric-device may trigger the operation of one or multiple devices at the same time (e.g., the brightness is 650lx), or trigger no applet (e.g., the brightness is 400lx). The corresponding applet will be triggered or not depending on the current state value being above or below a threshold value. After checking all the applets that are triggered by a specific numeric-device, Specifuzz will take threshold values and split the measuring range of this device into several sub-ranges. If there are t threshold values, Specifuzz will arrange these t values in ascending order to form a list. Each element in this list is denoted as L i (1 i t), and L 1 ... L t . Then the measuring range covers from min to max will be divided into t+1 sub-ranges:
We also can generate a table for a trigger and numeric-deivce, as shown in Table. II. For each trigger and numeric-device, a similar table can be generated.
D. Specifuz-IFTTT Procedure
After extracting the key information from applets and merging items, the Specifuz-IFTTT can begin working. The procedure for Specifuz-IFTTT consists of intercepting the event from an untrigger-device, intercepting events that can not trigger any applets, intercepting the events can trigger an applet but unnecessary, and finally, randomizing values within a numeric range.
1) When a new event comes to the agent SmartApp of
Specifuz-IFTTT, the agent first checks if the event is from a trigger-device or not. If the corresponding device is not in T , then all events from this device should not be uploaded. 2) Specifuz-IFTTT has constructed the trigger-state lists for each trigger-device. After 1), although this new event comes from a device belongs to T , if it does not belong to the trigger-state lists of this device, it will also not be uploaded.
3) After the above 2 steps, Specifuz-IFTTT will check the current state value of the corresponding actuator (if there is a corresponding SmartThings actuator device). If the current state value equals the consequential state value of the applet, it means that this event will change nothing if it is uploaded, and this event will be intercepted too. 4) Finally, if the event is to be uploaded, Specifuz-IFTTT will check if the event is numeric or not. If it is a numeric event, Specifuz-IFTTT will first check the subrange of this value (Table. II) and generate a random value within the sub-range. After these steps, the event will be uploaded.
V. EVALUATION WITH THE CASAS DATASETS
In this section, we introduce how we designed the experiment to compare the original IFTTT and our Specifuz-IFTTT. We have each version process an identical series of CASAS datasets, to simulate a scenario and understand to what extent the IFTTT can monitor a user.
A. CASAS Datasets Overview
We anaylyzed four CASAS datasets, hh104, hh105, hh110 and hh111. These datasets are the monitoring records of different users living in a single apartment over two months, except hh110, which is about one month. The event records in each single-apartment include events generated by the motion sensors, contact sensors, temperature sensors, switches, and remaining battery of some devices.
B. Set the Applets for Every Dataset
We divided all the devices of every dataset into two groups: trigger-device and idle-device. In the trigger-device group, motion sensors and contact sensors are discrete-devices, and temperature sensors are numeric-devices. In the idle-device group, there is an actuator sub-group. We used switches as actuators because they can be operated both automatically or manually as mentioned above.
We set one applet for every switch, and randomly selected devices from the trigger-device group for every applet. Then, all remaining devices are idle-devices.
1) For discrete-devices, we set the applets as If the value of motion sensor is "active", or the value of contact sensor is "open", then turn on the corresponding switch. 2) We calculated the average value of every temperature sensor and set the rules triggered by these temperature sensors as: If the temperature is above its average value, then turn on the corresponding switch. For each dataset, we counted up the number of event records that the two IFTTTs could obtain. The main idea of evaluation is to compare the number of event records. For each experiment, we let the two IFTTTs subscribe the dataset and run the same applets. The original IFTTT gains states of all trigger-devices and periodically refreshs the state of the idle-devices. However, the modified IFTTT can only gain the events as they are filtered and fuzzed, as we described in Sec. IV. 
C. Comparing the Records Amount
Each event record item of a user contains behavior pattern information of that user. The more event items IFTTT gets, the more likely IFTTT is to be able to discover and recognize the behavior pattern of a user. This is also the main idea of Specifuz: filter the events that uploaded to IFTTT as much as possible. We experimented with the datasets and compare the results of the two IFTTTs, this is can be shown in Table. III. As we can see, for the same dataset, the Specifuz-IFTTT reduces items significantly compared to the original IFTTT. The amount of event items uploaded to the Specifuz-IFTTT is no more than 2.2% (hh104) of the original IFTTT.
D. Comparing the Numeric Records
For numeric records, in addition to filtering redundant events, the Specifuz-IFTTT randomizes the numeric values. We believe that these fluctuations can also reflect the behavior patterns of a user. Then, IFTTT cannot track the fluctuation of the temperature, humidity, and illuminance in a living environment. Fig. 3 shows the comparison of the records from selected temperature sensors that uploaded to the different IFTTTs. The red line plots the records accessible to the original IFTTT, while the green line plots records accessible to Specifuz-IFTTT. This proves that the Specifuz-IFTTT gets fewer records and that none of these records are accurate (only the first 10 days records are shown).
VI. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy will be of ongoing interest, especially in the smart home environment. In this paper, we explained how IFTTT monitors its smart home users in a hidden way. We also proposed a method of preventing this privacy leakage. We believe that our "Specifuz" can also be applied to the other 3rd-party apps of the smart home platforms.
